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Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 319-340

Setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0007801281     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00018     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (15)

References (16)
  • 1
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    • Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: Should the penalty fit the crime?
    • Andreoni, James (1991) 'Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: should the penalty fit the crime?' Rand Journal of Economics 22, 385-95
    • (1991) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.22 , pp. 385-395
    • Andreoni, J.1
  • 2
    • 0001152529 scopus 로고
    • Regulation, asymmetric information and auditing
    • Baron, David, and David Besanko (1984) 'Regulation, asymmetric information and auditing,' Rand Journal of Economics 15, 447-70
    • (1984) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.15 , pp. 447-470
    • Baron, D.1    Besanko, D.2
  • 3
    • 0000787258 scopus 로고
    • Crime and punishment: An economic approach
    • Becker, Gary (1968) 'Crime and punishment: an economic approach,' Journal of Political Economy 76, 169-217
    • (1968) Journal of Political Economy , vol.76 , pp. 169-217
    • Becker, G.1
  • 4
    • 0003375133 scopus 로고
    • Law enforcement, malfeasance, and the compensation of enforcers
    • Becker, Gary, and George J. Stigler (1974) 'Law enforcement, malfeasance, and the compensation of enforcers,' Journal of Legal Studies. Reproduced in George J. Stigler ed. (1988) Chicago Studies in Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
    • (1974) Journal of Legal Studies
    • Becker, G.1    Stigler, G.J.2
  • 5
    • 0010941147 scopus 로고
    • Chicago: University of Chicago Press
    • Becker, Gary, and George J. Stigler (1974) 'Law enforcement, malfeasance, and the compensation of enforcers,' Journal of Legal Studies. Reproduced in George J. Stigler ed. (1988) Chicago Studies in Political Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)
    • (1988) Chicago Studies in Political Economy
    • Stigler, G.J.1
  • 6
    • 0000679627 scopus 로고
    • Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives
    • Besley, Timothy, and John McLaren (1993) Taxes and bribery: the role of wage incentives,' Economic Journal 103, 119-41
    • (1993) Economic Journal , vol.103 , pp. 119-141
    • Besley, T.1    McLaren, J.2
  • 7
    • 84866833683 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corruption, extorsion and evasion
    • Facultés universitaires Notre-Dame-de-la-paix, Namur
    • Hindriks, Jean, Michael Keen, and Abnihay Muthoo (1996) 'Corruption, extorsion and evasion,' Working Paper, Facultés universitaires Notre-Dame-de-la-paix, Namur
    • (1996) Working Paper
    • Hindriks, J.1    Keen, M.2    Muthoo, A.3
  • 8
    • 0001353815 scopus 로고
    • Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior
    • Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell (1994) 'Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior,' Journal of Political Economy 102, 583-605
    • (1994) Journal of Political Economy , vol.102 , pp. 583-605
    • Kaplow, L.1    Shavell, S.2
  • 9
    • 49349097628 scopus 로고
    • The private enforcement of the law
    • Landes, William, and Richard Posner (1975) 'The private enforcement of the law,' Journal of Legal Studies 1, 1-46
    • (1975) Journal of Legal Studies , vol.1 , pp. 1-46
    • Landes, W.1    Posner, R.2
  • 10
    • 0030353648 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known
    • Lewis, Tracy (1996) 'Protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known,' Rand Journal of Economics 27, 819-47
    • (1996) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.27 , pp. 819-847
    • Lewis, T.1
  • 11
    • 0000201195 scopus 로고
    • Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement
    • Malik, Arun S. (1990) 'Avoidance, screening and optimum enforcement,' Rand Journal of Economics 21, 341-53
    • (1990) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.21 , pp. 341-353
    • Malik, A.S.1
  • 12
    • 0000028277 scopus 로고
    • Monitoring vis-à-vis investigation in enforcement of law
    • Mookherjee, Dilip, and I.P.L. P'ng (1992) 'Monitoring vis-à-vis investigation in enforcement of law,' American Economic Review 82, 556-65
    • (1992) American Economic Review , vol.82 , pp. 556-565
    • Mookherjee, D.1    P'ng, I.P.L.2
  • 13
    • 84937304302 scopus 로고
    • Marginal deterrence in enforcement of law
    • _ (1994) 'Marginal deterrence in enforcement of law,' Journal of Political Economy 102, 1039-66
    • (1994) Journal of Political Economy , vol.102 , pp. 1039-1066
  • 14
    • 0010950913 scopus 로고
    • Private vs. public enforcement of fines
    • Polinsky, A. Mitchell (1980) 'Private vs. public enforcement of fines,' Journal of Legal Studies 9, 105-27
    • (1980) Journal of Legal Studies , vol.9 , pp. 105-127
    • Polinsky, A.M.1
  • 15
    • 84977413772 scopus 로고
    • The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines
    • Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell (1979) "The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines,' American Economic Review 69, 880-91
    • (1979) American Economic Review , vol.69 , pp. 880-891
    • Polinsky, A.M.1    Shavell, S.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.