The impact of noise on iterated prisoner's dilemma with multiple levels of cooperation

Proceedings of the 2004 Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC2004

Volumn 1, Issue , 2004, Pages 348-355

  Chong, Siang Yew ^a   Yao, Xin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GROUP RATIONALITY; ITERATED PRISONERS DILEMMA (IPD); NOISY ENVIRONMENTS; REALISTIC SIMULATION;

ACOUSTIC NOISE; ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; FREQUENCY STABILITY; NEURAL NETWORKS; STABILITY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 4344617926     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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