Differences between the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions

Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Applied Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 42-48

  Carlsson, Bengt ^a   Jönsson, K Ingemar ^a  

^a BLEKINGE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Chicken game; Game theory; Noise; Prisoner's dilemma; Tit for tat

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; MATRIX ALGEBRA; RANDOM PROCESSES; SPURIOUS SIGNAL NOISE;

CHICKEN GAME; EVOLUTIONARY SIMULATION; ITERATED GAMES; ITERATED PRISONER DILEMMA; MUTUAL DEFECTION;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036037187     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/508791.508802     Document Type: Conference Paper

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