Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 77, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 285-299

  Miller, Nolan H ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031539391     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2332     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Ben-Porath E., Kahneman M. Communication in repeated games with private monitoring. J. Econ. Theory. 70:1996;281-297.
2. Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Game Theory. 1991;MIT Press, Cambridge.
3. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econ. 13:1982;324-340.
4. Legros P., Matsushima H. Efficiency in partnerships. J. Econ. Theory. 55:1991;296-322.
5. Legros P., Matthews S. Efficient and nearly-efficient partnerships. Rev. Econ. Stud. 68:1993;599-611.
6. Ma C.-t. A. Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents. Rev. Econ. Stud. 55:1988;555-572.
7. Radner R., Myerson R., Maskin E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53:1986;59-70.
8. Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53:1986;43-58.
9. Rasmusen E. Moral hazard in risk-averse teams. Rand J. Econ. 18:1987;428-435.
10. Williams S., Radner R. Efficiency in partnerships when the joint output is uncertain. The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability: Essays in Honor of Stanley Reiter. 1988;Kluwer Academic, Boston.