Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 66, Issue 3-4, 2008, Pages 558-581

  Jeon, Doh Shin ^a   Menicucci, Domenico ^b  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Brain drain; Fame; Incentives; Science

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649088088     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.012     Document Type: Article

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