Taming the local leviathan: Institutional and economic constraints on municipal budgets

Urban Affairs Review

Volumn 43, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 663-690

  Craw, Michael ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Budget; Institutions; Interjurisdictional competition; Leviathan hypothesis; Reformism

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); PUBLIC SPENDING; RENT SEEKING; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 42149104377     PISSN: 10780874     EISSN: 15528332     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1078087407311588     Document Type: Article

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