Nested levels of institutions: State rules and city property taxes

Urban Affairs Review

Volumn 40, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 634-654

  McCabe, Barbara Coyle ^a   Feiock, Richard C ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Form of government; Intergovernmental; Local governance; Mandate; Property tax

Indexed keywords

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS; URBAN POLITICS;

EID: 18744371019     PISSN: 10780874     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1078087404274136     Document Type: Article

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