The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 698-713

  Crocker, Keith J ^a   Slemrod, Joel ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41749084655     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00107.x     Document Type: Article

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