Corporate tax evasion with agency costs

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 9-10, 2005, Pages 1593-1610

  Crocker, Keith J ^a   Slemrod, Joel ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency costs; Enforcement; Tax evasion

Indexed keywords

EID: 23244441605     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003     Document Type: Article

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