Vote switchers and party influence in the U.S. house

Legislative Studies Quarterly

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 59-77

  Young, Garry ^a,c   Wilkins, Vicky ^b  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

^c Department of Political Science ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41449092953     PISSN: 03629805     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3162/036298007X201985     Document Type: Article

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