The transition to Republican rule in the house: Implications for theories of congressional politics

Political Science Quarterly

Volumn 112, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 541-567

  Aldrich, John H ^a   Rohde, David W ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0000331755     PISSN: 00323195     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2657691     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
2. David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
3. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Krehbiel, "Where's the Party?" British Journal of Political Science 23 (April 1993): 235-266; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (January 1996): 7-40.
4. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Krehbiel, "Where's the Party?" British Journal of Political Science 23 (April 1993): 235-266; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (January 1996): 7-40.
5. Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Krehbiel, "Where's the Party?" British Journal of Political Science 23 (April 1993): 235-266; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (January 1996): 7-40.
6. Recently, Krehbiel in "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock" developed the fuller logic of passage not just within a single chamber but through both chambers and in the context of the possibility of presidential veto and override attempts. The result reflects the impact of not just the ideal point of the median member in, say, the House, but also various other median points, veto points, etc. At least in the 1996 article, however, he continues to contrast his expected outcome with that hypothesized to be chosen under the conditional party government explanation. Because we will be focusing empirically on the organizing of the party and Congress under conditional party government, rather than on location of policies actually chosen, we will develop here the logic of the single-chamber, majorities rule explanation. In either case, Krehbiel's explanations do not predict partisan "bias" to rules or especially policy outcomes.
7. See Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Institutionalizing Majority Rule; A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications" American Economic Review 72 (May 1982): 367-71 for proof.
8. See Richard D. McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multi-dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," Journal of Economic Theory 18 (June 1976): 472-82; and Norman Schofield, "Insatability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economics Studies 45 (October 1978): 195-211.
9. See Richard D. McKelvey, "Intransitivities in Multi-dimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control," Journal of Economic Theory 18 (June 1976): 472-82; and Norman Schofield, "Insatability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economics Studies 45 (October 1978): 195-211.
10. Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
11. Indeed, that the Speaker is far more likely to be thought of as the leader of the majority party than as the leader of the House of Representatives speaks clearly about this point.
12. For evidence, see Aldrich, Why Parties?
13. It is, of course, quite correct that observing increased party-line voting in a legislature does not demonstrate that partisan organizations within the House are strengthening (see below for elaboration and see the Appendix for formal demonstration). It could be, as Krehbiel argues in "Where's the Party?" merely a coincidence, because members are voting their electorally induced policy preferences. It is not, however, a mere coincidence that the electorate induces cleavages between affiliates of the two parties. Rather, these are the consequences inter alia of partisan institutions, albeit institutions that are electoral rather than internal to the House.
14. Note that such a conclusion necessarily requires some degree of party cleavage. Otherwise, if "Democrat" and "Republican" carried no policy differentiation, and thus the two party memberships were distributed identically to each other and thereby the whole House, then both would want collectively just what the full House would want collectively. But that is also, of course, to say that the condition in conditional party government is entirely unsatisfied.
15. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House.
16. William F. Connelly, Jr. and John J. Pitney, Jr., Congress' Permanent Minority? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994), 26.
17. Ibid., 58-59.
18. Gabriel Kahn and Timothy J. Burger, "Solomon, Livingston Win Chairs," Roll Call, 17 November 1994, 1, 42. They report that Gingrich permitted Solomon to head Rules after consulting other Republican members, and then only after "he had a 'come to Jesus' meeting" with Solomon.
19. The committee needed an acting chair because the ranking member, Joe McDade (PA) was under federal indictment and could not succeed to the chair under Conference rules.
20. Kahn and Burger, "Solomon, Livingston Win Chairs," 42.
21. Karen Foerstel, "Gingrich Flexes His Power In Picking Panel Chiefs," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 November 1994, 3326.
22. Craig Karmin, "Gingrich Ignores Seniority in Selecting Key Chairmen," The Hill, 16 November 1994, 9.
23. Richard Wolf, "Speaker's Team Concept Has Put his House in Order," USA Today, 8 March 1995.
24. These calculations are based on comparisons of the committee rosters listed in the supplements to Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report published on 1 May 1993 and 25 March 1995.
25. Connelly and Pitney, Congress' Permanent Minority? 26.
26. Guy Gugliotta, "In New House, Barons Yield to the Boss," Washington Post, 1 December 1994.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Mary Jacoby, "For Gingrich, 2002 or Bust," Roll Call, 15 December 1994, 14.
30. Jonathan D. Salant, "New Chairmen Swing to the Right; Freshmen Get Choice Posts," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 10 December 1994, 3493.
31. Mary Jacoby, "New GOP Rules Lock In Power," Roll Call, 8 December 1994, 24.
32. Janet Hook, "House Republicans Rehearse Taking the Reins of Power," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 December 1994, 3548.
33. Babara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1983), 142-46; Rohde. Parties and Leaders, 87-88.
34. Babara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1983), 142-46; Rohde. Parties and Leaders, 87-88.
35. Deborah Kalb, "The Official Gingrich Task Force List," The Hill, 29 March 1995, 8; Kalb, "Government by Task Force: The Gingrich Model," The Hill, 22 February 1995, 3.
36. Deborah Kalb, "The Official Gingrich Task Force List," The Hill, 29 March 1995, 8; Kalb, "Government by Task Force: The Gingrich Model," The Hill, 22 February 1995, 3.
37. Kalb, "Government by Task Force," 3.
38. Thomas Rosenstiel, "Why Newt Is No Joke," Newsweek, 10 April 1995, 26.
39. Richard Cohen, "The Transformers," National Journal, 4 March 1994, 531.
40. Jennifer Senior, "Gingrich Immerses Self in Key Committees," The Hill, 1 March 1995, 3.
41. Rosenstiel, "Why Newt Is No Joke," 27.
42. Senior, "Gingrich Immerses Self in Key Committees," 3.
43. Wolf, "Speaker's Team Concept Has Put his House in Order," 5A.
44. Rosenstiel, "Why Newt Is No Joke," 27.
45. Gabriel Kahn, "Republicans Pick New Committee Chairs," Roll Call, 8 December 1994, 14.
46. Nicholas A. Masters, "Committee Assignments," American Political Science Review 59 (June 1961): 345-57.
47. Rohde, Parties and Leaders, 136-37.
48. Mike Mills, "GOP Selects Leaders: Michel, Cheney, Lewis," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 10 December 1988, 3475.
49. Timothy J. Burger, "Ax to Fall on Three House Panels: DC, Post Office, Merchant Marine," Roll Call, 17 November 1994, 1.
50. Salant, "New Chairmen Swing to the Right," 3494. The committee chairs are from Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means; the leaders are the whip and the chairs of the Conference, the Policy committee, and the Campaign Committee.
51. Mary Jacoby, "Big States Big Losers in Gingrich's Plan for Committee on Committees," Roll Call, 1 December 1994, 3.
52. Mary Jacoby, "Conference Adopts Gingrich's Steering Panel Setup," Roll Call, 8 December 1994, 22.
53. Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988); Rohde, Parties and Leaders; Barbara Sinclair, "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (November 1994): 477-94.
54. Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988); Rohde, Parties and Leaders; Barbara Sinclair, "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (November 1994): 477-94.
55. Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988); Rohde, Parties and Leaders; Barbara Sinclair, "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy," Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (November 1994): 477-94.
56. Mary Jacoby, "'Chairman' Solomon Says He Plans to Grant Open Rules on 75 Percent of Bills Next Year," Roll Call, 28 November 1994, 18.
57. Jonathan D. Salant, "Under Open Rules, Discord Rules," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 28 January 1995, 277.
58. Mary Jacoby, "Six Weeks Into Majority, GOP Asks: How Open Should Open Rules Be?" Roll Call, 13 February 1995, 20.
59. Salant, "Under Open Rules, Discord Rules," 277.
60. Mary Jacoby, "Centrists In GOP Threaten On Rules," Roll Call, 20 March 1994, 1.
61. Mary Jacoby, "Three-Quarters 'Open,' or Two-Thirds 'Closed'? Parties Cant't Agree on How to Difine Rules," Roll Call, 13 April 1995, 15.
62. Ibid., 7.
63. John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. "Theories of the Party in the Legislature and the Transition to Republican Rule in the House" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995), appendix.
64. Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," American Political Science Review 75 (June 1981): 411-25.
65. Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives," American Political Science Review 63 (September 1969): 787-807.
66. Mary Jacoby, "For Gingrich, 2002 or Bust," Roll Call, 15 December 1994, 1.
67. An analogous example, which we did not mention above, was the abolition of 28 "legislative service organizations" (commonly known as caucuses), like the Democratic Study Group. These organizations served the interests of members with shared concerns (some being bipartisan, as with the Space Caucus) and were repositories of independent expertise on issues. Their abolition removed another potential source of competition with the leadership.
68. Indeed, Gingrich accepted the appointment of a few more moderate members as chairs, but on less consequential committees as with Benjamin Oilman of New York for International Relations. Those chairs are, however, closely watched and are often under pressure to produce legislative results that depart significantly from their own preferences and from what they would probably have sent to the floor under the old institutional arrangements. See, for example, the discussion of Gilman's role on the State Department Reauthorization bill in Carroll J. Doherty, "Gilman Under Party Pressure," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 13 May 1995, 1335.
69. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). On the "textbook" view, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Congressional Institutions and Behavior: he Changing Textbook Congress" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., American Political Institutions and the Problems of Our Time (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989). Additional perspectives on the matter of delegation will be found in D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) ; and Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan.
70. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). On the "textbook" view, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Congressional Institutions and Behavior: he Changing Textbook Congress" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., American Political Institutions and the Problems of Our Time (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989). Additional perspectives on the matter of delegation will be found in D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) ; and Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan.
71. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). On the "textbook" view, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Congressional Institutions and Behavior: he Changing Textbook Congress" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., American Political Institutions and the Problems of Our Time (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989). Additional perspectives on the matter of delegation will be found in D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) ; and Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan.
72. David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). On the "textbook" view, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Congressional Institutions and Behavior: he Changing Textbook Congress" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., American Political Institutions and the Problems of Our Time (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989). Additional perspectives on the matter of delegation will be found in D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) ; and Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan.
73. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders; and Rohde, "Electoral Forces, Political Agendas, and Partisanship in the House and Senate" in Roger H. Davidson, ed., The Postreform Congress (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992).
74. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders; and Rohde, "Electoral Forces, Political Agendas, and Partisanship in the House and Senate" in Roger H. Davidson, ed., The Postreform Congress (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992).
75. Quoted by Connelly and Pitney, Congress' Permanent Minority?, 23 from Timothy J. Burger, "Bob Michel Defends Statement Labeling Frosh as 'Hard-Line,'" Roll Call, 16 August 1993, 1. Patricia R. Hurley and Brinck Kerr, "First Term Members in the 103rd House: Their Effects on Partisanship and Policy" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1995) show that freshmen of both parties in the 103rd House were more supportive of their respective parties' positions than were more senior members.
76. Quoted by Connelly and Pitney, Congress' Permanent Minority?, 23 from Timothy J. Burger, "Bob Michel Defends Statement Labeling Frosh as 'Hard-Line,'" Roll Call, 16 August 1993, 1. Patricia R. Hurley and Brinck Kerr, "First Term Members in the 103rd House: Their Effects on Partisanship and Policy" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1995) show that freshmen of both parties in the 103rd House were more supportive of their respective parties' positions than were more senior members.
77. Quoted by Connelly and Pitney, Congress' Permanent Minority?, 23 from Timothy J. Burger, "Bob Michel Defends Statement Labeling Frosh as 'Hard-Line,'" Roll Call, 16 August 1993, 1. Patricia R. Hurley and Brinck Kerr, "First Term Members in the 103rd House: Their Effects on Partisanship and Policy" (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1995) show that freshmen of both parties in the 103rd House were more supportive of their respective parties' positions than were more senior members.
78. Roll Call, 28 January 1993, 32-33.
79. Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995), 337-39.
80. Timothy J. Burger and Mary Jacoby, "In Baltimore, Frosh Pledge 'Revolution,'" Roll Call, 12 December 1994, 1.
81. Jeff Shear, "Force Majeure?," National Journal, 11 March 1995, 601-04.
82. Jackie Calmes, "House GOP Freshmen, Unafraid of Sacred Cows Face Moment of Truth in Balanced-Budget Talks," Wall Street Journal, 11 May 1995.
83. David S. Cloud, "Gingrich Clears the Path For Republican Advance," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 November 1994, 3322.
84. Ibid., 3319.
85. One place this became clear was during the sometimes heated debate on the proposed constitu-tional amendment to limit congressional terms. For example, freshman Mark Sanford (SC) referred to senior members as "an unnecessary 'political working class,'" and Nick Smith (MI), elected in 1992, said they were "a little more receptive . . . to special interests." Guy Gugliotta, "Young, Old Cast Slurs As GOP Unity Cracks," Washington Post, 30 March 1995.
86. Gabriel Kahn and Benjamin Sheffner, "Class of'94 Hits Jackpot," Roll Call, 12 December 1994, 1.
87. Tim Curran, "97 Percent Solution," Roll Call, 5 June 1995, A1.
88. Graeme Browning, "The GOP's Young Turks," National Journal, 25 February 1995, 481.
89. See Rohde, Parties and Leaders, 35-37.
90. Gabriel Kahn, "GOP 'CATS' Aim at Lunch Bunch,'" Roll Call, 4 May 1995, 1.
91. Eliza Newlin Carney, "Family Time," National Journal, 29 July 1995, 1948.
92. Laurie Goodstein, "Gingrich Vows to Pursue Christian Coalition Agenda," Washington Post, 18 May 1995.
93. Carroll J. Doherty, "Time and Tax Cuts Will Test GOP Freshman Solidarity," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1 April 1995, 916.
94. Seniors, "Gingrich Immerses Himself in Key Committees," 3.
95. Doherty, "Time and Tax Cuts Will Test GOP Freshman Solidarity," 916.
96. Gabriel Kahn, "In Intramural Skirmish, the GOP Moderates' 'Tuesday Lunch Bunch' Wins First Big Victory," Roll Call, 16 March 1995, 12.
97. Wolf, "Speaker's Team Concept," 5A.
98. See, for example, Cooper and Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style" and David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government," Congress and the Presidency 14 (Autumn 1987): 111-33.
99. See, for example, Cooper and Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style" and David W. Rohde and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Leaders and Followers in the House of Representatives: Reflections on Woodrow Wilson's Congressional Government," Congress and the Presidency 14 (Autumn 1987): 111-33.
100. See Shepsle, "Congressional Institutions and Behavior: The Changing Textbook Congress."
101. George Lardner, Jr., "Gingrich Promised NRA on Gun Control," Washington Post, 1 August 1994. (Emphasis added.)
102. Cooper and Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style."
103. It occurred 12 July, on the Interior Appropriations bill and involved an unusual coalition of Democrats and GOP conservatives from the CATS group. See Timothy J. Burger, "After a Defeat, House Leaders Must Regroup," Roll Call, 17 July 1995, 1.
104. Marcia Gelbart, "GOP Women Tell Leaders to Soft-pedal Abortion," The Hill, 26 July 1994, 1.
105. Carney, "Family Time," 1951.
106. See Aldrich, Why Parties?" 216-218.
107. Wolf, "Speaker's Team Concept," 5A.