Assessing the influence of incentives on physicians and medical groups

Medical Care Research and Review

Volumn 61, Issue 3 SUPPL., 2004, Pages

  Town, Robert ^a   Wholey, Douglas R ^a   Kralewski, John ^a   Dowd, Bryan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Contracting; Financial incentives; Physician organizations

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIOR; CONFERENCE PAPER; CULTURAL FACTOR; ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD; FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT; HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH ECONOMICS; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM; MEDICAL PRACTICE; PHYSICIAN; PRODUCTIVITY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; HEURISTICS; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; NESTING; ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY; REINFORCEMENT;

ATTITUDE OF HEALTH PERSONNEL; CONTRACT SERVICES; EFFICIENCY, ORGANIZATIONAL; GROUP PRACTICE; HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH; HUMANS; ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; QUALITY ASSURANCE, HEALTH CARE; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; UNITED STATES;

EID: 4143102492     PISSN: 10775587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1077558704267507     Document Type: Conference Paper

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