Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union

Economic Policy

Volumn 23, Issue 54, 2008, Pages 297-362

  Debrun, Xavier ^a,b   Moulin, Laurent ^a,b   Turrini, Alessandro ^a,b   Ayuso i Casals, Joaquim ^a,b   Kumar, Manmohan S ^a,b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b EUROPEAN COMMISSION   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFERENCE PROCEEDING; EUROPEAN UNION; FISCAL POLICY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; NATIONAL PLANNING; POLICY IMPLEMENTATION;

EURASIA; EUROPE;

EID: 41149091290     PISSN: 02664658     EISSN: 14680327     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

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