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Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 281-288

Is limit pricing evolutionarily stable?

Author keywords

ESS; Limit pricing; Replicator dynamics

Indexed keywords


EID: 0041975050     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-003-0154-z     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (2)

References (17)
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    • Gandolfo, G.1
  • 4
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    • The evolutionary stability of bluffing in a class of extensive form games
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    • Gardner R. Morris M (1991) The evolutionary stability of bluffing in a class of extensive form games. In: Selten R (ed) Game equilibrium models. I. Evolution and game dynamics. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York
    • (1991) Game Equilibrium Models. I. Evolution and Game Dynamics
    • Gardner, R.1    Morris, M.2
  • 5
    • 0000851275 scopus 로고
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    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 443-459
    • Milgrom, P.1    Roberts, J.2
  • 6
    • 0002875937 scopus 로고
    • Developments on the oligopoly front
    • Modigliani F (1958) Developments on the oligopoly front. Journal of Political Economy 66: 215-232
    • (1958) Journal of Political Economy , vol.66 , pp. 215-232
    • Modigliani, F.1
  • 8
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    • Why imitate, and if so, how? Abounded rationality approach to multi-armed bandits
    • Schlag KH (1997) Why imitate, and if so, how? Abounded rationality approach to multi-armed bandits. Journal of Economic Theory 78:127-159
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    • Schlag, K.H.1
  • 9
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  • 10
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    • Selten, R.1
  • 11
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    • Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games-correction and further development
    • Selten R (1988) Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games-correction and further development. Mathematical Social Sciences 16: 223-266
    • (1988) Mathematical Social Sciences , vol.16 , pp. 223-266
    • Selten, R.1
  • 14
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    • Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.