Computational modelling vs. Computational explanation: Is everything a turing machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 93-115

  Piccinini, Gualtiero ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 40549142221     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048400601176494     Document Type: Article

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