Computation without representation

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 137, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 205-241

  Piccinini, Gualtiero ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 37649008738     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-005-5385-4     Document Type: Article

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