When does one bad apple spoil the barrel? An evolutionary analysis of collective action

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 499-527

  Myatt, David P ^a   Wallace, Chris ^b  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; CORRELATION; ECONOMIC THEORY; GAME THEORY; PUBLIC GOODS;

MALUS X DOMESTICA;

EID: 40449120301     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00482.x     Document Type: Article

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