An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 67-76

  Myatt, David P ^a   Wallace, Chris ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b TRINITY COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Evolution; Public goods; Quantal response; Volunteer's dilemma

Indexed keywords

EID: 37849045277     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.005     Document Type: Article

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