Institutional checks and balances and the political control of the money supply

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 360-377

  Lohmann, Susanne ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001200652     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028651     Document Type: Article

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