Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 129, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 57-80

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Ünver, M Utku ^b  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

^b KOÇ UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Coalition proof Nash equilibrium; Credible deviation; Group stability; Many to many matching; Pairwise stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745104115     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001     Document Type: Article

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