A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure

Economic Theory

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 737-746

  Alkan, Ahmet ^a  

^a SABANCI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Lattice; Path independent choice function; Revealed preference; Stable matchings; Two sided market

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036014365     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990100179     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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