Implementation in the many-to-many matching market

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 199-212

  Sotomayor, Marilda ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Core; Implementation; Matching model; Mechanism; Pairwise stable matching

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345770281     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00047-2     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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