Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 364-382

  Devetag, Giovanna ^a   Warglien, Massimo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PERUGIA   (Italy)

^b CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Bi orders; Cognition; Experiments; Language; Mixed motive; Monotonicity; Preferences; Projectivity; Pure motive; Short term memory

Indexed keywords

EID: 39149104360     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.007     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Baddeley A.D. Human Memory: Theory and Practice (1990), Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ
2. Bazerman M.H. Negotiator judgment: A critical look at the rationality assumption. Amer. Behav. Sci. 27 (1983) 618-634
3. Bazerman, M.H., Baron, J., Shonk, K., 2001. Enlarging the societal pie-A cognitive perspective. Working paper No. 02-081, Harvard Business School
4. Brandenburger A.M., and Nalebuff J.N. Co-opetition (1996), Doubleday, New York, NY
5. Camerer C. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction (2003), Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ
6. Camerer, C., Ho, T., Chong, J.K., 2002. A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results. Working paper, California Institute of Technology
7. Costa-Gomez M., Crawford V., and Broseta B. Cognition and behavior in normal-form games: An experimental study. Econometrica 69 (2001) 1193-1235
8. Davey B.A., and Priestley H.A. Introduction to Lattices and Order (1990), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK
9. Devetag G., and Warglien M. Games and phone numbers: Do short term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?. J. Econ. Psych. 24 (2003) 189-202
10. Devetag M.G., Legrenzi P., and Warglien M. Focusing in naive game playing. In: Schaeken V., De Vooght G., Vandierendonck A., and d'Ydewalle G. (Eds). Deductive Reasoning and Strategies (1999), Erlbaum Associates, NJ 287-299
11. Goeree J.K., and Holt C.A. Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions. Amer. Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 1402-1422
12. Hopcroft J.E., and Ullman J.D. Introduction to Automata Theory, Languages and Computation (1979), Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA
13. Hyder E.B., Prietula M.J., and Weingart L.R. Getting to best: Efficiency versus optimality in negotiation. Cognitive Sci. 24 2 (2000) 169-204
14. Johnson-Laird P.N. Mental Models (1983), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK
15. Just M.A., and Carpenter O.A. A capacity theory of comprehension. Psych. Rev. 99 (1992) 122-149
16. Kareev Y. Not that bad after all: Generation of random sequences. J. Exper. Psych. Human Perception Performance 18 (1992) 1189-1194
17. Knez M., and Camerer C. Increasing Cooperation in prisoner's dilemmas by establishing a precedent of efficiency in coordination games. Organ. Behav. Human Dec. Process. 82 82 (2000) 194-216
18. Kreps D. Game Theory and Economic Modeling (1990), Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford
19. Marcus S. Algebraic Linguistics: Analytical Models (1967), Academic Press, NY
20. McNamara R. Argument Without an End (1999), Public Affairs, NY
21. Mel'cuk I.A. Dependency Syntax: Theory and Practice (1987), State Univ. of New York Press, Albany, NY
22. Miller G. The magical number seven, plus or minus two. Some limits of our capacity for processing information. Psych. Rev. 63 (1956) 81-97
23. Nagel R. Experimental results on interactive competitive guessing. Amer. Econ. Rev. 85 (1995) 1313-1326
24. Newell A., and Simon H.A. Human Problem Solving (1972), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
25. Pillutla M., and Chen X.P. Social norms and cooperation in social dilemmas: The effects of context and feedback. Organ. Behav. Human Dec. Process. 78 2 (1999) 81-103
26. Ross L., and Ward A. Naive realism: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In: Brown T., Reed E., and Turiel E. (Eds). Values and Knowledge (1996), Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ 103-135
27. Rubinstein A. Why are certain properties of binary relations relatively more common in natural language?. Econometrica 64 (1996) 343-356
28. Rubinstein A. Economics and Language (2000), Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK
29. Schelling T. The Strategy of Conflict. second ed (1980), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA
30. Schreider J.A. Equality, Resemblance and Order (1975), MIR Publishers, Moscow, USSR
31. Schwartz O. Structured language model parsing. Core Natural Language Processing Technology Applicable to Multiple Languages: Final Report, Structured Language Model Parsing (1998), CLSP, Johns Hopkins University
32. Simon H.A., and Schaeffer J. The game of chess. In: Aumann R.J., and Hart S. (Eds). Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications vol. 1 (1992), Elsevier Science, The Netherlands 1-17
33. Stahl D.O., and Wilson P.W. Experimental evidence on players' models of other players. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 25 (1994) 309-327
34. Walsh W.B., and Betz N.E. Tests and Assessment (1990), Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ