Games and phone numbers: Do short-term memory bounds affects strategic behavior?

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 189-202

  Devetag, Giovanna ^a   Warglien, Massimo ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO   (Italy)

^b CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

^c Cognitive Science Laboratory ^*  (Italy)

Author keywords

Heterogeneity; Information processing; Iterated reasoning; Short term memory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037333297     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00202-7     Document Type: Article

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