Ranking contingent monitoring systems

Management Science

Volumn 53, Issue 9, 2007, Pages 1501-1509

  Fagart, Marie Cécile ^a   Sinclair Desgagné, Bernard ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE ROUEN   (France)

^b HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^c ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

Author keywords

Conditional monitoring; Downside risk aversion; Moral hazard; Optimal audits; Principal agent; Value of information

Indexed keywords

INFORMATION SYSTEMS; PUBLIC POLICY; RISK ANALYSIS;

CONDITIONAL MONITORING; DOWNSIDE RISK AVERSION; MORAL HAZARDS; OPTIMAL AUDITS; VALUE OF INFORMATION;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 38549102634     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0693     Document Type: Article

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