Ranking of information systems in agency models: An integral condition

Economic Theory

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 489-496

  Demougin, Dominique ^a   Fluet, Claude ^b  

^a OTTO VON GUERICKE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Information systems; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035530141     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004116     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Demougin, D., Fluet, C.: Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition. Discussion Paper of the Faculty of Economics and Management at Magdeburg 29 (1998b)
4. Holmström, B.: Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 74-91 (1979)
5. Jewitt, I.: Information and principal-agent problems. Mimeo, University of Bristol (1997)
6. Kim, S. K.: Efficiency of an information system in an agency model. Econometrica 63, 89-102 (1995)
7. Kim, S. K.: Limited liability and bonus contracts. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 6, 899-913 (1997)
8. Rogerson, W.: The first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica 53, 1357-1367 (1985)