The value of correlated signals in agencies

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 150-167

  Rajan, Madhav V ^a   Sarath, Bharat ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031479590     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2555945     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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4. BLACKWELL, D. AND GIRSHICK, M.A. Theory of Games and Statistical Decisions. New York: Dover Publications, 1954.
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8. _ AND _. "The Value of Information in the Delegation Problem." Discussion Paper no. 776, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University, 1980b.
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10. HOLMSTRÖM, B. "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10 (1979), pp. 74-91.
11. KIM, S. "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model." Econometrica, Vol. 63 (1995), pp. 89-102.