Efficiency of 'simple' liability rules when courts make erroneous estimation of the damage

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 39-58

  Singh, Ram ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELHI   (India)

Author keywords

Court errors; Efficient liability rules; Liability rules; Nash equilibrium; Negligent injurer's liability; Simple liability rules; Total social costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843098272     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1023980208945     Document Type: Article

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