The principle of full compensation in tort law

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 319-332

  Van Wijck, Peter ^a   Winters, Jan Kees ^b  

^a LEIDEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b Netherlands Competition Authority   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Negligence; Tort

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843117198     PISSN: 09291261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1011260419168     Document Type: Review

References (11)

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