Efficient liability rules: Complete characterization

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 105-124

  Jain, Satish K ^a   Singh, Ram ^a  

^a JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY   (India)

Author keywords

Condition of negligence liability; Efficient liability rules; Liability rules; Nash equilibria; Total social costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036510297     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s007120200008     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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