Multilane HMAC - Security beyond the birthday limit

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4859 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 18-32

  Yasuda, Kan ^a  

^a NTT CORPORATION   (Japan)

Author keywords

Birthday attack; Failure friendly; Hash function; HMAC; Message authentication code; Multilane; NMAC

Indexed keywords

CRYPTOGRAPHY; DATA COMPRESSION; MESSAGE PASSING; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SOFTWARE DESIGN;

BIRTHDAY ATTACKS; HASH FUNCTIONS; MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE (MAC); MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 38349192057     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77026-8_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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