"Sandwich" is indeed secure: How to authenticate a message with just one hashing

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4586 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 355-369

  Yasuda, Kan ^a  

^a NTT CORPORATION   (Japan)

Author keywords

Compression function; Envelope MAC; Hash function; HMAC; MAC; Merkle Damg rd; Message authentication code; RFC1828

Indexed keywords

FUNCTION EVALUATION; ITERATIVE METHODS; MESSAGE PASSING; SECURITY OF DATA;

HASH FUNCTION; MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE (MAC);

AUTHENTICATION;

EID: 38149068247     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73458-1_26     Document Type: Conference Paper

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