On the security of randomized CBC-MAC beyond the birthday paradox limit a new construction

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2365, Issue , 2002, Pages 237-251

  Jaulmes, Éliane ^a   Joux, Antoine ^a   Valette, Frèdèric ^a  

^a DCSSI Crypto Lab   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

SECURITY OF DATA;

BIRTHDAY PARADOXES; BLOCK CIPHERS; COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEADS; NEW CONSTRUCTIONS; ONE-PASS; RANDOM ORACLE MODEL;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 84949450111     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-45661-9_19     Document Type: Article

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