A failure-friendly design principle for hash functions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3788 LNCS, Issue , 2005, Pages 474-494

  Lucks, Stefan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Failure friendliness; Hash function; Multi collision; Provable security

Indexed keywords

DATA COMPRESSION; FUNCTIONS; ITERATIVE METHODS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SECURITY OF DATA;

FAILURE-FRIENDLINESS; HASH FUNCTION; MULTI-COLLISION; PROVABLE SECURITY;

FAILURE ANALYSIS;

EID: 33646776051     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11593447_26     Document Type: Conference Paper

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