The role of the state in economic development

Kyklos

Volumn 58, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 283-303

  Tabellini, Guido ^a  

^a BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC PLANNING; LIBERALIZATION; POLICY STRATEGY; STATE ROLE;

EID: 18844449988     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0023-5962.2005.00289.x     Document Type: Article

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