Pierre Bourdieu, the 'cultural turn' and the practice of international history

Review of International Studies

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 155-181

  Jackson, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 38149053577     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S026021050800795X     Document Type: Article

References (170)

1. Patrick Finney, 'Introduction: What is International History', in P. Finney (ed.), Palgrave Advances in International History, pp. 2 and 17.
2. See also Jessica Gienow-Hecht, 'Introduction', in J. C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), Culture and International History (Oxford: Berghahn, 2004), pp. ix and 3-26.
3. Quotation from Charles Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations', in Michael Kammen (ed.), The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 355-82.
4. This literature is large and growing all the time. For a useful guide to the American context see Jessica Gienow-Hecht, 'Cultural Transfer', pp 257-78; Akira Iriye, 'Culture and International History', in M. Hogan and T. Paterson, Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 241-56;
5. and Susan Carruthers, 'Propaganda, Communications and Public Opinion', in Finney (ed.), Advances in International History, pp. 189-222.
6. For an overview, see Iriye, 'Culture and International History', pp. 241-56;
7. for an example of this approach see his Cultural Internationalism and World Order, 2nd edn. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
8. Quoted in Peter Burke, What is Cultural History? (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), p. 2.
9. Cited from Peter Mandler, 'The Problem with Cultural History', Cultural and Social History, 1 (2004), p. 95;
10. see also Burke, What is Cultural History?, pp. 23-5, 30-46 and 112-16.
11. The term 'culturalist' is used throughout in Andrew Rotter, 'Culture', in Finney (ed.), Advances in Internationa! History, pp. 267-99.
12. Susan Brewer, '"As Far As We Can": Culture and US Foreign Relations', in Robert Schulzinger (ed.), A Companion to American Foreign Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 15-30.
13. See the discussions in Frank Costigliola, 'Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language and Metaphor', in Hogan and Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History, pp. 279-302;
14. Rotter, 'Culture' especially pp. 268-74;
15. Anders Stephanson, 'Commentary: Considerations on Culture and Theory', Diplomatic History, 18:1 (1994), pp. 107-19.
16. See, for example, the argument put forward by Carla Hesse, 'The New Empiricism', Cultural and Social History, 1 (2004), pp. 201-7.
17. Marc Trachtenberg rightly characterises this approach as part of a 'constructivist challenge' to the epistemological foundations of traditional historical practice. He is very critical of this phenomenon in The Craft of International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 7-14.
18. For a more positive representation, see especially Costigliola, 'Reading for Meaning' and Michael H. Hunt, 'Ideology', in Hogan and Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History, pp. 221-40.
19. For examples of gender-based analyses of US foreign policy, see Andrew Rotter, 'Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964', Journal of American History, 81 (1994), pp. 518-42;
20. Michelle Mart, 'Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel, 1948-1960', Diplomatic History, 20 (1996), pp. 357-80;
21. Frank Costigliola, "The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance', Diplomatic History, 21 (1997), pp. 163-83;
22. idem, 'Unceasing Pressure for Penetration: Gender, Pathology and Emotion, in George Kennan's Formation of the Cold War', Journal of American History, 83 (1997), pp. 1308-39;
23. Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood' How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998);
24. and Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002).
25. For general discussions of this literature see Glenda Shiga, 'Gender', in Finney (ed.), International History, pp. 300-19,
26. and Marc Frey, 'Gender, Tropes and Images', in Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher (eds.), Culture and International History, pp.212-20.
27. See, for example, the 'Symposium' on 'African Americans and US Foreign Relations', in Diplomatic. History, 20 (1996), pp. 531-650.
28. See also, among many others, Alexander De Conde, Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1992);
29. Thomas Borstalman, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001);
30. Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and US Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 1996);
31. R. L. Doty, Imperial Encounter: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),
32. and Eyes Off the Prize: the United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human. Rights, 1944-1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
33. This literature is large, amorphous, and seems to increase daily. Any attempt to summarise it here would lead to misrepresentation. A good starting point for the history of US policy is the essays in Hogan and Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History. International relations theorist David Campbell made an important contribution to this debate with Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 2nd edn. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998);
34. see also the thoughtful discussion in Andrew Rotter, 'Saidism without Said: Orientalism and US Diplomatic History', American Historical Review, 105:4 (2000), pp. 1205-17.
35. In the British context Linda Colley's Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994) is a seminal text. For a trenchant criticism of the use of 'national identity',
36. see Mandler, 'The Problem with Cultural History", pp. 109-13.
37. See, among many others, Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002);
38. Mark Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC: North Carolina University Press, 2000);
39. Andrew Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000);
40. and Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime imperialism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).
41. See also the collection edited by Christian Appy, Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000);
42. and Thomas Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002).
43. On this emerging line of enquiry and argument, see Emily Rosenberg, 'Considering Borders', and Nathan Citino, 'The Global Frontier: comparative history and the frontier borderland approach', in Hogan and Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History, pp. 176-93 and 194-211 respectively;
44. see also the thoughtful discussion by Charles Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives of the Modern Era', American Historical Review, 105:3 (2000), pp. 807-31.
45. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell, 1959);
46. idem, The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York, 1969);
47. James Joll, '1914: The Unspoken Assumptions: An Inaugural Lecture' (London: London School of Economics, 1968);
48. see also his The Origins of the First World War, 2nd edn. (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 199-233;
49. D. C. Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Notre Dame, LA: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965),
50. and idem, 'The New International History', international History Review, 9 (1987), pp. 518-52;
51. Zara Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969);
52. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978);
53. idem, Border Crossings: Studies in International History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988);
54. John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1987).
55. A point made by both Melvyn Leffler and David Reynolds. See Leffler 'New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations', Diplomatic History, 19:2 (1995), pp. 173-96;
56. and Reynolds, 'International History, the Cultural Turn and the Diplomatic Twitch', Cultural and Social History, 3 (2006), pp. 75-91.
57. Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 5;
58. William H. Sewell Jr., 'The Concept(s) of Culture', in L. Hunt and V. Bonnell (eds.), Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Direction in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 43-6
59. and Rotter, 'Culture', p. 267.
60. Quoted in Volker Dekpat, 'Cultural Approaches to International Relations: A Challenge?' in Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher (eds.), Culture and International History, p. 181.
61. Peter Burke, one of the leading practitioners and proponents of the 'new' cultural history, has similarly acknowledged that 'It is increasingly difficult to say what does and does not count as culture', What is Cultural History?, pp. 5 and 29;
62. see also Leffler, 'New Approaches, Old Interpretations' and Reynolds, 'The Cultural Turn and the Diplomatic Twitch".
63. Robert Buzzanco has been perhaps the most voluble of these critics: 'Where's the Beef? Culture Without Power in the Study of US Foreign Relations', Diplomatic History, 24:3 (2000), pp. 623-32;
64. 'What Happened to the New Left? Toward A Radical Reading of American Foreign Relations', Diplomatic History, 23:4 (1999), pp. 575-607.
65. See also Leffler, 'New Approaches, Old Interpretations' and Bruce Kuklick, 'Confessions of an Intransigent Revisionist about Cultural Studies', Diplomatic History, 18:1 (1994), pp. 121-4.
66. Quoted in Dekpat, 'Cultural Approaches', p. 183. Marc Trachtenberg makes the same point when critiquing R. C. Collingwood in The Craft of International History, pp. 4-6 and 15-16.
67. For similar critiques see Frank Ninkovich, 'No Post-Morteras for Postmodernism Please', Diplomatic History, 22:3 (1998), pp. 458-60; Dekpat, 'A Challenge?', p. 183.
68. Many 'culturalist' historians, specialists on the history of mentalities for example, might argue that their work does not engage with issues of causality. This is difficult to admit, however, because any assertion concerning the importance of mentalities in understanding any aspect of human relations must rest, ultimately, on either implicit or explicit causal claims.
69. Quotations from Robert Dean, 'Commentary: Tradition, Cause and Effect and the Cultural History of International Relations', Diplomatic History, 24:2 (2000), p. 619.
70. Amy Kaplan, 'Commentary: Domesticating Foreign Policy', Diplomatic History, 18:1 (1994), pp. 97-105.
71. For a good example of this trend, see Robert Dean, 'Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy', Diplomatic History, 22:4 (1998), pp. 29-62.
72. See the observations of Zara Steiner, 'On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More', International Affairs, 73:3 (1997), pp. 531-46.
73. See the related criticism of Dekpat in 'Cultural Approaches', pp. 181-2. There have been efforts to counter this trend, among culturally inclined scholars by considering the history of American foreign relations in their 'international' or 'global' context. See especially the discussion in Michael Hogan, 'The "Next Big Thing"? The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age', Diplomatic History, 21:1 (2004), pp. 1-21.
74. Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, p. 30.
75. Ninkovich, 'No Post-Mortems', p. 460.
76. Quote from Perry Anderson, 'Structure and Subject', in In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (London: Verso, 1983), pp. 32-55.
77. See also Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)
78. and idem, 'Interpretation of the Sciences of Man', in Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan, Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look: (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 33-81.
79. Giddens defines 'structuration' as 'the structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure', The Constitution of Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1984), p. 376.
80. For a fascinating argument that narrative history provides the best means to approach the agent/structure dilemma see Geoffrey Roberts, 'History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR', Review of International Studies, 32 (2006), pp. 703-14.
81. Sewell, 'Concept(s) of Culture', p. 48.
82. Pierre Bourdieu, Choses dites (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1987), p. 147.
83. Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Transformation of the International Security Order (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 25.
84. Pierre Bourdieu, Le sens pratique (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1980), pp. 88-9.
85. Quoted from J. B. Thompson, 'Préface' to Pierre Bourdieu, Langage et pouvoir symbolique (Paris: Seuil, 2001), pp. 24-5
86. [this is a French translation of the English Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Polity, 1991)].
87. David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 111-13.
88. Quote from Swartz, Culture and Power, p. 211.
89. For a good discussion of these criticisms, see Richard Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 79-83.
90. Quote from Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 56 [my emphasis];
91. but see especially Bourdieu, In Other Words (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), pp. 110-19.
92. Burke, What is Cultural History?, pp. 56-7. Burke's account of the genesis of 'habitus' as a concept is based on a conversation with Bourdieu in 1982.
93. Terry Eagleton, Ideology (London: Verso, 1990), p. 157.
94. See, for example, the important discussions of Hunt, 'Ideology', of Costigliola, 'Reading for Meaning' and of Rosenberg, 'Considering Borders', all in Hogan and Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History.
95. Pierre Bourdieu, 'Les rites d'institution', reprinted in Ce que parler veut dire, pp. 121-34.
96. On the thé à cinq heures see the vivid description in the memoirs of Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Confessions d'un vieux diplomat (Paris: Flammarion, 1953), pp. 31-4.
97. See also the discussions in M. B. Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins of the First World War, 1898-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.22-3.
98. Pierre Bourdieu with Loic Wacquant, Réponses ... Pour une anthropologie reflexive (Paris: Seuil, 1992), p. 72.
99. Bourdieu, Choses dites, pp. 134 and 86 respectively.
100. For an excellent explanation of this, see Swartz, Culture and Power, pp. 117-36.
101. For an insightful critical perspective, see Charles Taylor 'To Follow a Rule ...', in E. LiPuma, M. Postone and C. Calhoun (eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp.45-60.
102. Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, p. 113 and pp. 109-15 more generally.
103. The latter quotation is from Eagleton, Ideology, p. 158;
104. the former is from Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, pp. 111-12.
105. See Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security', in P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 33-75.
106. A good explanation of the role of capital is provided by Swartz in Culture and Power, pp. 73-82 and 122-9.
107. Bourdieu, Le sens pratique, pp. 33-7 and 108-17.
108. The upper bourgeoisie were particularly heavily represented - 92 per cent of the students enrolled on this programme were from this socioeconomic group. J. Keiger, 'Patriotism, Politics and Policy in the Foreign Ministry, 1880-1914', in R. Tombs (ed.), Nationhood and Nationalism in France (London: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 259-62.
109. Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: the first institutional responses to twentieth-century diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 52, 54 and 105-7.
110. e siècle (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1980), pp. 155-8.
111. Cf. Jean-Luc Barré, Philippe Berthelot: l'éminence grise, 1866-1934 (Paris: Pion, 1998), p. 134. The importance attributed to the characteristics listed above are evident in the foreign ministry personnel dossiers available for consultation in the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris), Personnel, Dossiers, 2ème série.
112. Quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant, Réponses, pp. 102-3.
113. See especially Alan Caillé, Don, intérêt et désintéressement, Bourdieu, Mauss, Platon et quelques autres (Paris: Éditions de la découverte, 1994), pp. 44-52.
114. See, among others, Richard Jenkins, 'Pierre Bourdieu and the Reproduction of Determinism', Sociology, 16:2 (1982), pp. 270-81;
115. and Scott Lash, 'Pierre Bourdieu: cultural economy and social change", in LiPuma et al. (eds.), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, pp. 193-211.
116. See the discussion of Bourdieu's 'theory of change' in Swartz, Culture and Power, pp. 211-17.
117. Both citations from John Dower, '"Culture", Theory and Practice in US-Japan Relations', Diplomatic History, 24:3 (2000), p. 526.
118. For recent critiques of 'realism' by international historians, see the chapters by Gehard Weinberg, Edward Ingram, John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Schroeder, in C. Elman and M. Elman (eds.), Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations (London: MIT Press, 2001).
119. His best known work in this domain are the case studies in Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique, précdé de trois études d'ethnologie kabyle (Berne: Librairie Droz, 1972)
120. translated by Richard Nice as Outline of a Theory of Practice.
121. For a discussion of Bourdieu's impact, see Burke, What is Cultural History?, pp. 56-7, 71-8, 82-5
122. and idem, History and Social Theory, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), pp. 66-7, 70-1 and 174-6;
123. Bourdieu's influence is also well-illustrated in Gabrielle Spiegel (ed.), Practising History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Tum (London: Routledge, 2005), especially chapters 9-13 which are grouped together in a section entitled 'Experience and Practice' (pp. 179-263).
124. Stefano Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations', European Journal of International Relations, 6:2 (2000), pp. 147-82;
125. Ronen Palan, 'A World of their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations', Review of International Studies, 26:2 (2000), pp. 575-98;
126. Williams, Culture and Security and an increasingly substantial body of work by Didier Bigo, including 'Global (In)Security: The Field of the Professionals of Unease Management and the Ban-opticon', in N. Sakai and J. Solomon (eds.), Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
127. Cited in L. D. Wacquant, 'Towards a Reflective Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu', Sociological Theory, 1 (1989), p. 50.
128. Cited from Matthew Connelly, 'Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence', American Historical Review, 205:3 2000), p. 739.
129. There is no mention of decision-makers whatsoever, for example, in P. Milza, 'Culture et relations internationales'. Relations Internationales, 24 (1980), pp. 361-79.
130. See especially Alan Henrikson, 'The Geographical "Mental Maps" of American Foreign Policy Makers', International Political Science Review, 1:4 (1980), pp. 495-530
131. and idem, 'Mental Maps', in Hogan and Paterson (eds.), Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 1st edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 177-92.
132. Quoted in Hunt, 'Ideology', pp. 222 and 224.
133. See, among the titles not cited above, La Distinction: critique sociale du judgement (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1979);
134. Homo academicus (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1984)
135. and Propos sur le champ politique (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 2000).
136. See especially Zara Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office before the Great War', in B. J. C. McKercher and D. J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in. British. Foreign Policy, 1895-1939 (Edmonton, 1984);
137. idem, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1969)
138. and idem, The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982).
139. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's Place, 1900-1975 (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1984) and "The New International History'.
140. Cited from '1914: The Unspoken Assumptions', p. 6.
141. 'La faute de choses et la faute des hommes', in Jacques Bainville, Les conséquences politiques de la paix, reissue with a foreword by Georges-Henri Soutou (Paris: Éditions Godefroy de Bouillon, 1996), pp. 15-23; see also the discussion in Roberts, 'History, Theory and the Narrative Turn'.
142. Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964),
143. The quotations are the titles of chs. 11 and 12. The second edition of this book was published in English as Introduction to the History of International Relations, trans. Mary Ilford (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).
144. See also J.-B. Duroselle and Maurice Vaisse, 'L'histoire des relations internationales', in F. Bédarida (ed.), L'histoire et le metier d'historien (Paris, 1996), pp. 341-58.
145. See the critiques of constructivist international relations theory by Guzzini, 'A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations'; Palan, 'A World of their Making' and Williams, Culture and Security, especially pp. 1-3 and 23-41.
146. See in particular, Stephen Pelz, 'Essay and Reflection: On Systematic Explanation in International History', International History Review, 12:4 (1990), pp. 661-880. Pelz offers what is essentially a political science model based on variables in an attempt to derive general laws. This is of course antithetical to the approach advocated in this essay.
147. On constructions of French identity see, among many others, Pierre Birnbaum, La France imaginée (Paris, 1998);
148. Herman Lebovics, True France: the wars over French cultural identity (Ithaca, NY: 1996);
149. Michel Winock, Parlez-moi de la France (Paris: Plon, 1995);
150. Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997);
151. and John Keiger, France and the World since 1870 (London: Arnold, 2001), esp. pp. 17-22.
152. Gilles Le Béguec, La République des avocats (Paris: Armand Colin, 2003).
153. See also Yves-Henri Gaudemont, Les Juristes et la vie politique sous la IIIème République (Paris: Presses Universitaires Françaises, 1970).
154. Nicolas Roussellier, Le Parlement de l'éloquence: la souveraineté de la délibération au lendemain de la Grande Guerre (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997), pp. 44-5;
155. Le Béguec, République des avocats, pp. 115-21; and Robert Young, French Foreign Policy 1918-1945, 2nd edn. (Wilmington, VA: Scholarly Resources, 1993), pp. 303-4.
156. On the role of the École libre see John Keiger, 'Patriotism, politics and policy in the Foreign Ministry, 1880-1914', in R. Tombs (ed.), Nationhood and Nationalism in France, 1889-1918 (London: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 255-67.
157. On the role of international law, see especially Jean Baillou et al., Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français: tome II, 1870-1980 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1984), pp. 413-19.
158. I have outlined this process in 'France and the Problems of Security and Disarmament after the First World War', Journal of Strategic. Studies, 29:2 (2006), pp. 247-80.
159. The term 'reorientation' is from Clemens Wurm, Die französische Sicherheitspolitik in der Phase der Umorientierung, 1924-1926 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1979). Wurm's interpretation is based on a more traditional approach and attributes little importance to cultural factors however.
160. The significance of this process has not been addressed in the existing literature but constitute a central argument in a monograph I am preparing entitled 'France and the Politics of Security in Europe, 1914-1928'.
161. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939).
162. For examples of recent studies focusing on the changed character of international politics after 1918, see Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
163. and Patrick Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
164. For excellent discussions of these developments, see Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 603-19;
165. and William Keylor 'Versailles and International Diplomacy', in M. Boemke, G. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds.), The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 469-505;
166. and Georges-Henri Soutou, 'L'ordre européen de Versailles à Locarno', in G.-H. Soutou and Claude Carrier (eds.), 1918-1925: Comment faire la paix? (Paris: Economica, 2001), pp.301-31.
167. See for example Marie-Renée Mouton, La Société des Nations et les intérêts de la France, 1920-1924 (Berne: Peter Lang, 1995);
168. and John Lewis Hogge II, 'Arbitrage, Sécurité, Désarmement: French security and the League of Nations, 1920-1925', Ph.D dissertation, New York University, 1994. I consider the impact of these pressures in my 'France and the Problems of Security and International Disarmament after the First World War', Journal of Strategic Studies, 29:3 (2006), pp. 247-80.
169. Here it is worth remembering the relative lack of precision with which Bourdieu describes and employs the concept of the 'champ'. This forces one to make choices regarding those fields which are of primary importance and those which are less crucial. It is of course possible to imagine additional fields, including those of the army general staff, the foreign ministry or the French council of ministers. Each of these was structured by the positions of key actors and characterised by competition for power and influence over policymaking. To avoid having to go on identifying more and more fields - a potentially endless task - my analysis considers rivalry and discord within these organisations in Bourdieuan terms, but implicitly rather than explicitly.
170. See most recently the interpretation of Cohrs in The Unfinished Peace. For an excellent discussion of the older literature, see Jon Jacobsen 'Strategies of French Foreign Policy after World War I', Journal of Modern History, 55 (1983), pp. 78-95.