Performance pay and adverse selection

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 279-298

  Moen, Espen R ^a   Rosén, Åsa ^b  

^a BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

^b STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Performance pay; Selection

Indexed keywords

LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; WAGE DETERMINATION;

EID: 24644442836     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00408.x     Document Type: Article

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