Do forward markets enhance competition?. Experimental evidence

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 415-431

  Le Coq, Chloé ^a   Orzen, Henrik ^b  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cournot competition; Experiments; Forward markets; Spot markets

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750152175     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.012     Document Type: Article

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