Repeated charitable contributions under incomplete information

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 525, 2008, Pages 60-91

  Bag, Parimal Kanti ^a   Roy, Santanu ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CHAOS THEORY; INFORMATION;

EID: 37749003954     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02104.x     Document Type: Article

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