On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 120, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 73-107

  Romano, Richard ^a   Yildirim, Huseyin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Accumulation games; Cournot Nash outcome; Stackelberg outcome

Indexed keywords

EID: 11344260348     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005     Document Type: Article

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