Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience: Why we still are not there yet

Current Opinion in Psychiatry

Volumn 20, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 559-569

  Mishara, Aaron L ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

Body schema; Default mode network; Perceptual binding; Schizophrenia; Self disorder; Time perception

Indexed keywords

FLUORODEOXYGLUCOSE F 18; GLUCOSE; GLUTAMINE;

BRAIN BLOOD FLOW; BRAIN METABOLISM; COGNITION; DECISION MAKING; FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; HUMAN; MENTAL DISEASE; NEUROIMAGING; NEUROSCIENCE; NONHUMAN; PERCEPTION; PHENOMENOLOGY; POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY; REVIEW; SCHIZOPHRENIA; SELF CONCEPT; TASK PERFORMANCE; TIME; ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE; AWARENESS; PATHOPHYSIOLOGY; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL; PSYCHOLOGY; PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY;

AWARENESS; HUMANS; MENTAL DISORDERS; MIND-BODY RELATIONS (METAPHYSICS); MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; NEUROSCIENCES; PSYCHIATRY; PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY; SCHIZOPHRENIA; SCHIZOPHRENIC PSYCHOLOGY;

EID: 37549069405     PISSN: 09517367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/YCO.0b013e3282f128b8     Document Type: Review

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