Forging the links between phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology: The emergence of a new discipline

Current Opinion in Psychiatry

Volumn 11, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 567-573

  Mishara, Aaron L ^a,d   Parnas, Josef ^b   Naudin, Jean ^c  

^a The Capital Region   (Denmark)

^b HVIDOVRE HOSPITAL   (Denmark)

^c HÔPITAL SAINTE MARGUERITE   (France)

^d RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEPRESSION; HUMAN; MENTAL DISEASE; NEUROBIOLOGY; NEUROSCIENCE; PHENOMENOLOGY; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHOLOGY; REVIEW; SCHIZOPHRENIA; TIME PERCEPTION;

EID: 0031713019     PISSN: 09517367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1097/00001504-199809000-00027     Document Type: Review

References (56)

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