Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-16

  Arya, Anil ^a   Mittendorf, Brian ^b   Sappington, David E M ^c  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Competition; Outsourcing; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; EARNINGS; MARKETING; OUTSOURCING; PROFITABILITY;

BERTRAND COMPETITION; COURNOT COMPETITION; RETAIL COMPETITION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 37249042822     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.006     Document Type: Article

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