Vertical enclosure: Vertical integration and the reluctance to purchase from a competitor

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 179-199

  Heavner, D Lee ^a  

^a ANALYSIS GROUP   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042858042     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00222.x     Document Type: Article

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