Disambiguation, Binding, and the Unity of Visual Consciousness

Theory & Psychology

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 747-777

  Larock, Eric ^a  

^a OAKLAND UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

ambiguity; attention; binding; consciousness; disambiguation; emergentism; object perception; spatial structure; unified experience

Indexed keywords

EID: 36949026922     PISSN: 09593543     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0959354307083492     Document Type: Article

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101. [email: larock@oakland.edu]