Against the functionalist reading of Aristotle's philosophy of perception and emotion

International Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 232-258

  LaRock, Eric F ^a  

^a SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 27644503841     PISSN: 00190365     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/ipq20024225     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. For example, see Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind" in Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
2. S. Marc Cohen, "The Credibility of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind" in Mohan Matthen, ed., Aristotle Today (Edmonton: Academic Press, 1987)
3. With respect to this sort of functionalist definition of Aristotle's notion of soul, see Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1978) p. 146
4. David Lewis, "Mad Pain and Martian Pain" in Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ed. Jack Crumley II (Mountain View: Mayfield, 2000) p. 112
5. Gilbert Ryle explains a dispositional property as follows: "To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized." See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949) p. 43
6. Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, p. 146
7. Cohen, "The Credibility of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind," p. 104
8. S. Marc Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism" in Nussbaum and Rorty, p. 61
9. Cohen, "Hylomorphism and Functionalism," p. 59
10. Aristotle, De Anima in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), I, 1, 403a16-18, hereafter referred to as DA followed by Bekker notation system and page number(s) of this translation. All references to Aristotle's philosophical and biological works are from this edition
11. DA, I, 1, 403a19-24, pp. 642-43
12. See Neil Campbell, Biology, 3rd edn. (Redwood City: Benjamin Cummings, 1993) pp. 983-85
13. Sir John Eccles, The Understanding of the Brain (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973) p. 8
14. See Jack Copeland, Artificial Intelligence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) pp. 219-25
15. Stephen M. Kosslyn and Oliver Koenig, Wet Mind: The New Cognitive Neuroscience (New York: Free Press, 1995) p. 67
16. Richard Lane, "Neural Correlates of Conscious Emotional Experience" in Richard D. Lane and Lynn Nadel, eds., Cognitive Neuroscience of Emotion (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) pp. 345-70
17. I thank Richard Swinburne for this triangular versus trilateral example. See Swinburne's The Evolution of the Soul, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997) p. 47
18. Edwin Hartman, Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian Investigations (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1977) p. 146
19. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972) pp. 144-52
20. See Francis Crick and Christof Koch, "Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness," Seminars in the Neurosciences 2 (1990) 263-75
21. Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994) pp. 203-14
22. Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, p. 204
23. David Chalmers, "Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness" in Consciousness and Emotion in Cognitive Science, ed. Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio (New York: Garland, 1998), p. 212
24. Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, "Circularity of Primate Prefrontal Cortex and Regulation of Behavior by Representational Knowledge" in Handbook for Physiology, ed. Plum and Mountcastle (Bethesda: American Physiological Society, 1987)
25. Jean Delacour, "The Memory System and Brain Organization" in Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory, ed. Lars-Goran Nilsson and Hans J. Morkowitsch (Seattle: Hogrefe and Huber, 1999) p. 254