Party systems in the making: The emergence and success of new parties in new democracies

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 113-133

  Tavits, Margit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 36949004164     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000069     Document Type: Article

References (148)

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6. Scott Mainwaring, 'Party Systems in the Third Wave', Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 67-81.
7. Sarah Birch, Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
8. Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist Party Systems; Mainwaring, 'Party Systems in the Third Wave'.
9. Simon Hug, Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).
10. Hug, Altering Party Systems.
11. Herbert Kitschelt, 'Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems', World Politics, 40 (1988), 194-234;
12. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa: Entwicklungsphasen und Erfolgsbedingungen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993);
13. see also Bonnie M. Meguid, 'Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success', American Political Science Review, 99 (2005), 347-59.
14. Robert Harmel and Lars Svasand, 'The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties' Platforms: The Cases of Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway', Party Politics, 3 (1997), 315-40;
15. Piero Ignazi, 'The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right Wing Parties in Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1992), 3-34;
16. Matt Golder, 'Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Wing Parties in Western Europe', Comparative Political Studies, 36 (2003), 432-66.
17. Lieven DeWinter and Huri Türsan, Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 1998).
18. Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
19. Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties', International Political Science Review, 6 (1985), 501-23;
20. Charles Hauss and David Rayside, 'The Development of New Parties in Western Democracies since 1945', in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds, Political Parties: Development and Decay (Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1978), pp. 31-57;
21. Hug, Altering Party Systems.
22. Marcus Kreuzer and Vello Pettai, 'Political Parties and the Study of Political Development', World Politics, 56 (2004), 608-33.
23. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 79-80;
24. see also pp. 120-1 and fn. 63 for more discussion on defining new parties.
25. Gary Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
26. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 99-104;
27. Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties';
28. Müller-Rommel, Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa;
29. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
30. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America;
31. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 99-104.
32. Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties'; Hug, Altering Party Systems;
33. Müller-Rommel, Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa.
34. Birch, Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe;
35. Tatiana Kostadinova, 'Do Mixed Electoral Systems Matter? A Cross-National Analysis of Their Effects in Eastern Europe', Electoral Studies, 21 (2004), 23-34;
36. Robert G. Moser, 'Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States', World Politics, 51 (1999), 359-84.
37. See Cox, Making Votes Count, pp. 153-8.
38. Margit Tavits, 'Party System Change: Testing a Model of New Party Entry', Party Politics, 12 (2006), 99-119.
39. See also Hug, Altering Party Systems.
40. Sarah Birch, 'Electoral Systems and Party System Stability in Post-Communist Europe' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001).
41. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
42. Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1995). In some cases, such as the United States and France, presidentialism. has also been related to less fragmented party systems
43. (Cox, Making Votes Count, pp. 187-8).
44. I thank Sarah Birch for alerting me to the potential effect of presidentialism on new party entry.
45. Cox, Making Votes Count.
46. Cox, Making Votes Count, p. 158.
47. Olga Shvetsova, 'Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects', Constitutional Political Economy, 14 (2003), 191-212.
48. Cox, Making Votes Count.
49. Cox, Making Votes Count.
50. Marek M. Kaminski, 'Do Parties Benefit From Electoral Manipulation? Electoral Laws and Heresthetics in Poland, 1989-93', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 14 (2002), 325-58;
51. Shvetsova, 'Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects'.
52. Goldie Shabad and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, 'Inter-Party Mobility among Parliamentary Candidates in Post-Communist East Central Europe', Party Politics, 10 (2004), 151-76.
53. Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, 'Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000', Party Politics, 7 (2001), 5-21.
54. Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 89;
55. Margit Tavits, 'The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe', American Journal of Political Science, 49 (2005), 283-98;
56. Arthur W. Turner, 'Postauthoritarian Elections: Testing Expectations About First Elections', Comparative Political Studies, 26 (1993), 330-49.
57. Raymond M. Duch and Harvey D. Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?' British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 63-91;
58. Margit Tavits and Taavi Annus, 'Learning to Make Votes Count: The Role of Democratic Experience', Electoral Studies, 25 (2006), 72-90.
59. Cox, Making Votes Count.
60. Cox, Making Votes Count, argues that viability is not clear 'in elections held in new democracies' (p. 152), yet given that over time viability becomes clearer 'a typical scenario in emerging democracies [is one] whereby a great number of parties spring up in the first elections, and there is a relatively slow winnowing out process' (p. 159).
61. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 89-99.
62. Kitschelt, 'Left-Libertarian Parties'.
63. Müller-Rommel, Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa.
64. Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, 'Why Do They Vote for Le Pen?' European Journal of Political Research, 22 (1989), 123-41.
65. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 89-99.
66. Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties' ;
67. Hug, Altering Party Systems;
68. Paul Lucardie, 'Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutros: Towards a Theory of New Party Emergence', Party Politics, 6 (2000), 175-85;
69. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
70. The entry model assumes that those who form parties are instrumentally rational, i.e. that they care about getting elected or influencing policy or both. If this assumption is incorrect and most of those who form parties instead derive the highest utility from simply participating in the electoral process, the model will be less efficient. In that case, neither the cost of winning a seat, nor the benefit from holding an office nor low probability of electoral support would deter entry. The only deterrence mechanism would be the cost of registering a party. Thus, if there is little or inconsistent empirical support for the entry model, the original assumption of instrumental party formers is called into question. However, as long as the empirical observations support the arguments, there is less concern about the correctness of these assumptions. Additionally, the new party entry argument rests largely within the institutionalist tradition. Institutions themselves are not entirely exogenous but may depend on cultural or marco-historical factors. This, however, does not undermine the usefulness of considering the effects of institutions.
71. Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties';
72. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 125-45.
73. It is possible that opposition parties also attract disappointed voters. This poses an uphill battle for empirically detecting the relationships outlined below. Yet, if the expected empirical patterns are detected, confidence in their robustness is increased.
74. Alexander C. Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff, "The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World', American Journal of Political Science, 39 (1995), 745-59.
75. Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
76. Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier, 'Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes', Annual Reviews of Political Science, 3 (2000), 183-219;
77. Joshua A. Tucker, 'The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We Studied, and How Have We Studied It?' Annual Reviews of Political Science, 5 (2002), 271-304.
78. Janice Bell, 'Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns During the Economic Transition in Poland, 1990-1995', Europe-Asia Studies, 49 (1997), 1263-91;
79. Jan Fidrmuc, 'Economics of Voting in Post-Communist Countries', Electoral Studies, 19(2000), 199-217;
80. Alexander C. Pacek, 'Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 123-44.
81. Elaine Fultz, 'Social Security Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: How Effective, Equitable and Secure?' (Geneva: International Social Security Association, 2002);
82. Barbara E. Kritzer, 'Social Security Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: Variations on a Latin American Theme', Social Security Bulletin, 64 (2001/02), 16-32.
83. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 'Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes',
84. but see also Joshua A. Tucker, Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
85. Robert E. Bohrer II, Alexander C. Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff, 'Electoral Participation, Ideology, and Party Politics and Post-Communist Europe', Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), 1161-72;
86. Benjamin Radcliff, 'Turnout and the Democratic Vote', American Politics Quarterly, 22 (1994), 259-76;
87. Pacek and Radcliff, 'The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World'.
88. Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
89. Birch, Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe.
90. Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe';
91. Stephen Whitefield, 'Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Polities', Annual Reviews of Political Science, 5 (2002), 181-200.
92. Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe';
93. Whitefield, 'Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Polities'.
94. Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Europe';
95. Whitefield, 'Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Polities';
96. Tatu Vanhanen, 'Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis', Journal of Peace Research, 36 (1999), 55-73.
97. M. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in M. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967);
98. Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, 'Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties', American Journal of Political Science, 38 (1994), 100-23.
99. I thank, again, Sarah Birch for pointing out the potential importance of this option on the ballot.
100. Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds, Cabinets in Eastern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
101. Jack Bielasiak, 'Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30 (1997), 23-44;
102. Tomas Kostelecky, Political Parties after Communism: Developments in East-Central Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002);
103. Hubert Tworzecki, Learning to Choose: Electoral Politics in East-Central Europe (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003).
104. The following elections were included: Armenia 2003; Bulgaria 1991, 1994, 1997 and 200.1; the Czech Republic 1992, 1996, 1998 and 2002; Estonia 1995, 1999 and 2003; Georgia 1999; Hungary 1994, 1998 and 2002; Latvia 1995,1998 and 2002; Lithuania 1996, 2000 and 2004; Moldova 1998 and 2001; Poland 1993, 1997 and 2001; Romania 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004; Russia 1995, 1999 and 2003; Slovakia 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2002; Slovenia 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004; Ukraine 1998 and 2000. Elections in Albania and Croatia - countries that passed the Freedom. House threshold - were not included because election results were available only for parties that won a seat in parliament. Disregarding other competitors would have introduced a clear bias. Furthermore, both countries were until very recently (Albania until 1997, when the state almost collapsed due to pyramid schemes, and Croatia until 2000, after the death of president Franjo Tudjman), essentially one-party states (Irena Grudzinska Gross, 'When Pyramids Collapse', East European Constitutional Review, 1 (1998), 〈http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol7numl/special/conversation.html>, last accessed on 9 February 2006;
105. British Helsinki Human Rights Group, Croatia 2000: Parliamentary Elections, 〈http://www.bhhrg.org/ CountryReport.asp?CountryID = 7〉, last accessed on 9 February 2006): the election results were manipulated in Albania, the government in office did not actually control the country in Croatia until 1995 and was autocratic there until 2000. Albania has held only two truly democratic elections and Croatia only one. Thus, leaving out these countries costs only a single case. Additionally, none of the analyses below is sensitive to case selection: the relationships hold whether or not any of the more dubious cases, such as Armenia or Georgia, are included.
106. Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 79-80.
107. As previous studies have noted, it is almost impossible to differentiate between a splinter and a 'genuinely new' party (Peter Mair, 'New Political Parties in Established Party Systems: How Successful Are They?' in E. Beukel, K. K. Klausen and P. E. Mouritzen, eds, Elites, Parties and Democracy: Festschrift for Professor Mogens N. Pedersen (Odense: Odense University Press, 1999), pp. 207-21). Even if those who originally formed the party have had no ties to other political parties, by the time of the election most new parties have recruited previous members of other parties to be on the ballot or even in the party leadership. This makes the difference between splinters and genuinely new parties very dubious. Indeed, in practical terms it makes no difference whether a party was created or is led/represented by somebody who used to belong to another party. Yet, strictly following the definitions, the former would be classified as a splinter while the latter would be genuinely new. This empirical obscurity makes the definition of 'genuinely new' much less straightforward and the classification of parties very difficult.
108. The threshold is applied mainly for a simple practical reason - 0.3 per cent is the minimum threshold at which it is possible to find reliable information about the history of parties and hence to determine their newness. Using a 0.3 per cent threshold has virtually no effect on the measure of the success of new parties - parties left out of the analysis contribute to the vote totals only marginally. In the case of the new party formation, the threshold may be more problematic. On the one hand, the analysis of new party entry should include all new parties that were formed regardless of their electoral returns. Leaving out the least successful new parties restricts the applicability of the arguments to a subset of new parties - those that are instrumentally rational. However, considering that the question about the emergence and success of new parties is important mostly to the extent that these new parties really have an impact on the existing party system, the threshold may be less problematic. Indeed, several authors have argued that including parties with very low vote totals in the count of new parties artificially inflates the count and have advised using even higher thresholds (David M. Olson, 'Party Formation and Party System. Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe', Political Studies, 46 (1998), 589-610;
109. Richard Rose, What is Europe? A Dynamic Perspective (New York: HarperCollins, 1996)). The 0.3 per cent threshold is arbitrary, but it is high, enough to filter out the most hopeless cases and avoid the results being driven by those parties that are largely irrelevant to the political process. At the same time, the threshold is low enough to take into account parties whose performance may not have been outstanding in their first election, but which are able to build their strength for the subsequent elections. In order to control the potential bias in choosing the 0.3 per cent threshold, I have replicated the analysis of the count of new parties using a threshold of 0.5 per cent (see Table 1). The results of the analyses improve when the threshold is increased suggesting, indeed, that the theoretical arguments of new party entry may be more applicable to the subset of new parties that are serious about the political process.
110. Robertson et al., Third Parties in America.
111. More detailed coding rules, the list of new parties, the vote share for new parties by country and by election and the complete list of sources are available at 〈www.missou.ri.edu/~ tavitsm〉.
112. Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties'; Hauss and Rayside, 'The Development of New Parties in Western Democracies since 1945';
113. Hug, Altering Party Systems;
114. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
115. Hug, Altering Party Systems.
116. Hug, Altering Party Systems;
117. Müller-Rommel, Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa;
118. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America.
119. Information for these three variables is gathered from the electoral laws. Most of these laws are available at 〈www.essex.ac.uk/elections〉, last accessed on 9 February 2006; for Armenia the information was obtained from the Central Election Commission at 〈http://www.elections.am/〉 , last accessed on 9 February 2006; for Georgia from 〈http://www.ifes.ge〉, last accessed on 9 February 2006; for Slovenia from 〈http://www.mnz.gov.si/ 〉 , last accessed on 9 February 2006.
120. Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes.
121. The source of this material is Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick. Walsh, 'New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions', World Bank Economic Review, 15 (2001), 165-76. Other potential indicators suchas formal electoral threshold and effective number of parties may capture disproportionality. In the preliminary analyses, neither of these indicators appeared significant or altered the performance of other variables in the model when used as a replacement for or in combination with the mean district magnitude. Given this, 1 have resorted to reporting the results with the latter variable only.
122. Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties'; Müller-Rommel, Grüne Parteien in Westeuropa.
123. Birch, Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe;
124. Kostadinova, 'Do Mixed Electoral Systems Matter?'
125. Robert G. Moser, 'Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States' ;
126. Olga Shvetsova, 'Gaining Legislative Control through Strategic District Nomination: The Case of the Russian Left in 1995', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27 (2002), 635-57.
127. A preliminary analysis also included a control variable for changes to the electoral system (such as change of the electoral system type, district structure, seat allocation formula or threshold). The variable was not significant and including it did not alter the effects of other variables.
128. Alan Siaroff, 'Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction', European Journal of Political Research, 42 (2003), 287-312.
129. All three variables constitute yearly averages measured in the election year. The reliability of the unemployment measure is of slight concern. The two sources at my disposal - International Labour Organization (〈http://www. ilo.org〉, last accessed on 9 February 2006) and International Monetary Fund (〈http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/logon.aspx〉, last accessed on 9 February 2006) - did not always agree on the unemployment rates. However, both variables performed more or less the same way in all equations increasing the confidence in the significance level and direction of the relationship. I resorted to using the IMF indicators only, because the data for the other two economic indicators are coded from the same source.
130. i is the share of ith ethnic group in the total population) does not change the results.
131. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance at 〈www.idea.int〉.
132. Replacing the Number of new parties with the list of institutional variables predicting the number of new parties does not alter the effect of other variables in the model of new party success.
133. See above; see also Cox, Altering Party Systems, pp. 151-72.
134. As the variance of the dependent variable was twice its mean, indicating potential overdispersion, I estimated the model originally with, negative binomial regression. However, it reduced to the Poisson regression (alpha = 4.2e-08).
135. James Stimson, 'Regression in Time and Space: A Statistical Essay', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 914-47.
136. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, 'What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time Series Cross-Section Data in Comparative Polities', American Political Science Review, 89 (1985), 634-47.
137. The analyses are performed with ST AT A. 9. Panel corrected standard errors are not available for the Poisson regression, but (Huber/White/Sandwich) robust standard errors within country clusters are reasonable substitutes for dealing withheteroscedasticity. The country effects for all analyses were checked by running a series of separate equations with a dummy for each country. The substantive results of the models presented here were not altered in those estimations. The residual test (see Hug, Altering Party Systems, p. 183) did not reveal any outliers to the models.
138. Various readers have suggested controlling for the following factors in the models estimating new party emergence: federalism, bicameralism and ethnic fragmentation. None of these variables appeared significant in the preliminary analyses of the two different models presented in Table 1. Including these variables did not change the performance of other variables in the model. Further, given that the entry theory in this article does not provide clear predictions for the effect of any of these variables, 1 decided not to include them, in the final models.
139. Hug, Altering Party Systems, p. 1.19;
140. See also Tavits, 'Party System. Change'.
141. As noted above, the original model included electoral histories as the only basis for elite level anticipation of electoral support (Cox, Making Votes Count, pp. 151-72). Indeed, when the whole battery of variables predicting the vote share for new parties is included in the model of new party entry, none of these variables is significant. The effect of democratic maturation, the variable capturing the original theoretical construct of the probability of electoral support remains robust.
142. To be sure, the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the success of new parties is not clear even in the context of advanced democracies: previous studies have not found a significant relationship between these variables (Hug, Altering Party Systems, pp. 132-3; Harmel and Robertson, 'Formation and Success of New Parties').
143. Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe'; Whitefield, 'Political Cleavages and Post-Communist Polities'.
144. Toke S. Aidt, 'Economic Voting and Information', Electoral Studies, 19 (2000), 349-62;
145. Martin Paldam and Peter Nannenstad, 'What Do Voters Know About Economy? A Study of Danish Data, 1990-1993', Electoral Studies, 19 (2000), 363-91.
146. Different tests (see fn. 85) allowed the conclusion that the models presented in Table 2 were robust.
147. William D. Berry and Stanley Feldman, Multiple Regression in Practice (Newbury Park, Calif. : Sage, 1985).
148. 2 = - ( - 0.38.1 )/2(0.023) = 8.28.