Unemployment matters: Voting patterns during the economic transition in Poland, 1990-1995

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 49, Issue 7, 1997, Pages 1263-1291

  Bell, Janice ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; MARKET TRANSITION; TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY; UNEMPLOYMENT; VOTING BEHAVIOUR;

POLAND;

EID: 0031390093     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139708412499     Document Type: Review

References (48)

1. Mieczyslaw Kabaj & Tadeusz Kowalik, 'Who is Responsible for Postcommunist Successes in Eastern Europe', Transition (World Bank), 6, 7-8, 1995, pp. 7-8.
2. Examples of this research, which often reach very different conclusions, include: Branko Milanovic, 'Social Costs of the Transition to Capitalism', Working Paper 1165, World Bank. 1993; A. Szulc, 'Poverty in Poland during the Transition Period: 1990-1992 Evidence', Discussion Paper No. 29, Polish Policy Research Group. University of Warsaw, 1994; World Bank, Understanding Poverty in Poland (Washington DC, World Bank, 1995); G.A. Cornia, 'Poverty, Food Consumption, and Nutrition During the Transition to the Market Economy in Eastern Europe', American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 84, 2, 1994, pp. 297-302.
3. Examples of this research, which often reach very different conclusions, include: Branko Milanovic, 'Social Costs of the Transition to Capitalism', Working Paper 1165, World Bank. 1993; A. Szulc, 'Poverty in Poland during the Transition Period: 1990-1992 Evidence', Discussion Paper No. 29, Polish Policy Research Group. University of Warsaw, 1994; World Bank, Understanding Poverty in Poland (Washington DC, World Bank, 1995); G.A. Cornia, 'Poverty, Food Consumption, and Nutrition During the Transition to the Market Economy in Eastern Europe', American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 84, 2, 1994, pp. 297-302.
4. Examples of this research, which often reach very different conclusions, include: Branko Milanovic, 'Social Costs of the Transition to Capitalism', Working Paper 1165, World Bank. 1993; A. Szulc, 'Poverty in Poland during the Transition Period: 1990-1992 Evidence', Discussion Paper No. 29, Polish Policy Research Group. University of Warsaw, 1994; World Bank, Understanding Poverty in Poland (Washington DC, World Bank, 1995); G.A. Cornia, 'Poverty, Food Consumption, and Nutrition During the Transition to the Market Economy in Eastern Europe', American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 84, 2, 1994, pp. 297-302.
5. Examples of this research, which often reach very different conclusions, include: Branko Milanovic, 'Social Costs of the Transition to Capitalism', Working Paper 1165, World Bank. 1993; A. Szulc, 'Poverty in Poland during the Transition Period: 1990-1992 Evidence', Discussion Paper No. 29, Polish Policy Research Group. University of Warsaw, 1994; World Bank, Understanding Poverty in Poland (Washington DC, World Bank, 1995); G.A. Cornia, 'Poverty, Food Consumption, and Nutrition During the Transition to the Market Economy in Eastern Europe', American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, 84, 2, 1994, pp. 297-302.
6. Geographical analysis of 1990 elections: J.J. Parysek, Z. Adamczak & R. Grobelny, 'Regional Differences in the Results of the 1990 Presidential Election in Poland as the First Approximation to a Political Map of the Country', Environment and Planning A, 23, 1991, pp. 1315-1329. See also: J. Gibson & A. Cielecka 'Economic Influences on the Political Support for Market Reform in Post-Communist Transitions: Some Evidence from the 1993 Polish Parliamentary Elections', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 5, 1995, pp. 765-785.
7. Geographical analysis of 1990 elections: J.J. Parysek, Z. Adamczak & R. Grobelny, 'Regional Differences in the Results of the 1990 Presidential Election in Poland as the First Approximation to a Political Map of the Country', Environment and Planning A, 23, 1991, pp. 1315-1329. See also: J. Gibson & A. Cielecka 'Economic Influences on the Political Support for Market Reform in Post-Communist Transitions: Some Evidence from the 1993 Polish Parliamentary Elections', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 5, 1995, pp. 765-785.
8. The right wing of Solidarity was in opposition to the communist regime before political change and democracy seemed even remotely possible. A logical conclusion is that former opposition leaders are not only ideologically committed but also risk takers. The hesitation of the centre-right and right-wing parties to give up a degree of autonomy in return for a greater probability of gaining seats may be outweighed by the possibility that a fragmented vote may leave one of these parties in the position of kingmaker, thus gaining political power disproportionate to their membership and electorate. This second strategy is riskier, but the rewards of the less likely outcome would be much greater than being one of several partners in an electoral coalition. For an application of this public choice concept to Poland see: T. Mickiewicz, 'Dobra publiczne, gra tchórza', Zycie Gospodarcze, 31 October 1993.
9. This conflict between liberalisation and redistribution may be illustrated by the conflict between external and internal pressures on economic policy. While the present SLD-PSL government has been rapidly passing legislation to liberalise Poland's banking and tax regulations in preparation for joining the OECD (in August 1996) and eventually the European Union, recent changes to the privatisation law have generated serious concern about the possibility of an increasingly interventionist role of the state in the economy.
10. While traditional, liberal economics examines economic behaviour in terms of utility, modern public choice texts tend to model behaviour in terms of preferences. Thus the utility function which the rational actor pursues can be defined in terms of preferences.
11. D. C. Mueller, Public Choice II (Cambridge and New York, 1989), p. 349.
12. J. W. Smith, 'A Clear Test of Rational Voting', Public Choice, 23, 1975, pp. 55-67.
13. D. C. Mueller. 'The Voting Paradox', in C. K. Rowley (ed.), Democracy and Public Choice (Oxford, 1987), p. 89.
14. G. H. Kramer 'Short Run Fluctuations in US Voting Behaviour, 1896-1964', American Political Science Review, 65, 1971, pp. 131-143.
15. A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Voting (New York, 1957).
16. D. R. Kinder & D. R. Kiewiet, 'Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 23, 1979, pp. 495-517.
17. CBOS, 'Poland's Most Pressing Problems', Polish Public Opinion, February 1994, p. 1 (n = 1226).
18. R. Rose & C. Haerpfer, 'Fears and Hopes: New Democracies Barometer Surveys', Transition (World Bank), 7, 5-6, pp. 13-14.
19. R. C. Fair, 'Econometrics and Presidential Elections', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 1996.
20. A similar but less extensive analysis is in A. C. Pacek. 'Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe', American Journal of Political Science, 38, 3, 1994, pp. 723-744. Independent variables in this article are unemployment, education and lagged 1989 Solidarity vote. Unemployment is found to be significant for the 1990 and 1991 elections, but the implications for the political party system are relatively unexplored.
21. J. Bell & T. Mickiewicz, 'Unemployment and State Sector Insiders during the Economic Transition in Poland', MOCT-MOST Economic Policy in Transforming Economies, 20, 1997.
22. Polls taken close to the date of the election are preferable to ones taken months or even years later. Shifts in popular approval of politicians and parties appear to cause voters to remember their choices differently as time passes.
23. See L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Central European Press, 1995), p. 298.
24. A. Kublik & P. Pacewicz, 'Nasza wyborcza szesciolatka', Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 December 1995, p. 2.
25. For instance, the controversies over PSL connections with BGZ in both the recapitalisation programme and PSL renting office space from BGZ at absurdly low rates; constant PSL blockading of any progress in privatisation, its constant lobbying for protection and tax breaks for the sole benefit of peasant farmers, etc.
26. Not to mention the recurring theme of anti-Semitism.
27. 'Jak Kwasniewski glosy zebral', Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 November 1995, p. 2 (n not given in text).
28. OBOP poll cited by Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 November 1995, p. 4 (n not given in the text).
29. The number of cases also varies with the number of regions in which the parties ran candidates.
30. INFAS data quoted in 'Wyborcza Statystyka', Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 November 1991, pp. 2-3 (n not given).
31. CBOS, 'Preference wyborcze spoleczenstwa na 2 tygodnie przed wyborami', Report No. 801/91, October 1991 (n = 850).
32. G. Blazyca & R. Rapacki, 'Continuity and Change in Polish Economic Policy: The Impact of the 1993 Election', Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 1, 1996, pp. 85-100.
33. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
34. Which was finally passed in the late summer of 1996. This law provides for greater cabinet and Sejm control over privatisations in sensitive and strategic sectors and places greater emphasis on changing corporate governance structures rather than proceeding with sales and ownership transfers.
35. One example of the PSL influence is that in the middle of 1994 a price equalisation scheme was implemented. While these programmes are found in most industrial economies, it protected Polish farmers by raising the price of food imports to the domestic level, thus eliminating undercutting by more efficient, mostly European producers.
36. Polityka, 17 September 1993.
37. OBOP poll cited in Donosy, 17 December 1996 (n not given in text).
38. Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, 1993, 'Preferencje wyborcze spoleczenstwa pod koniec czerwcu '93', Report No. 1028/93, July 1993, pp. 12-13 (n = 617).
39. P. G. Lewis, 'Political Institutionalisation and Party Development in Post-Communist Poland', Europe-Asia Studies, 46, 5, 1994, pp. 779-799.
40. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 16, Part II, 23 January 1997.
41. OMRI Daily Digest, No. 19, Part II, 28 January 1997.
42. J. Paradowska. 'Akcja ostatnej szansy' Polityka, 7 December 1996, pp. 20-24.
43. One omission is the lack of 1993 figures for BBWR. However, other analysis suggests that the inclusion of the data would not counteract the results as shown.
44. S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction', in S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York, 1967), pp. 1-63.
45. S. Whitefield & G. Evans, 'The Social Context of the December Elections in Russia: Public Attitudes and the Transition Experience', mimeo, 1994.
46. Gibson & Cielecka, pp. 781-782.
47. Bell & Mickiewicz.
48. CBOS poll cited in Donosy, 17 February 1997.