Civil conflict and secessions

Economics of Governance

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 45-63

  Spolaore, Enrico ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict technology; Economies of scale; External threats; Heterogeneity costs; Secessions

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749082904     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-007-0034-3     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Alesina A, Spolaore E (1997) On the number and size of nations. Q J Econ 112(4):1027-1056
2. Alesina A, Spolaore E (2003) The size of nations. MIT Press, Cambridge
3. Alesina A, Spolaore E (2005) War, peace and the size of countries. J Public Econ 89(7):1333-1354
4. Alesina A, Spolaore E (2006) Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. Eur Econ Rev 50(1):91-120
5. Alesina A, Spolaore E, Wacziarg R (2000) Economic integration and political disintegration. Am Econ Rev 90(5):1276-1296
6. Alesina A, Spolaore E, Wacziarg R (2005) Trade, growth, and the size of countries. In: Aghion P, Durlauf S (eds) Handbook of economic growth. North Holland, Amsterdam
7. Anderson B (1983) Imagined communities. Verso, London
8. Bolton P, Roland G (1997) The breakups of nations: a political economy analysis. Q J Econ 112(4):1057-89
9. Bordignon M, Brusco S (2001) Optimal secession rules. Euro Econ Rev 45:1811-34
10. Caselli F, Coleman WJ (2006) On the theory of ethnic conflict. NBER working paper no. W12125, Cambrifge
11. Collier P (2001) The economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. In: Crocker CA, Hampson FO, Aall PR (eds) Turbulent peace: the challenges of managing international conflict. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC
12. Collier P, Hoeffler A (1998) On economic causes of civil war. Oxf Econ Pap 50(4):563-573
13. Ellingsen T (1998) Externalities and internalities: A model of political integration. J Public Econ 68(2): 251-68
14. Fearon J, Laitin D (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. Am Polit Sci Rev 97(1):75-90
15. Findlay R (1996) Towards a model of territorial expansion and the limits of empires. In: Garfinkel M, Skaperdas S (eds) The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK
16. Garfinkel MR (1990) Arming as a strategic investment in a cooperative equilibrium. Am Econ Rev 80: 50-68
17. Garfinkel MR (2004a) Stable alliance formation in distributional conflict. Euro J Polit Econ 20:829-852
18. Garfinkel MR (2004b) On the stable formation of groups: managing the conflict within. Conflict Manage Peace Sci 21:43-68
19. Garfinkel MR (2004c) Global threats and the domestic struggle for power. Eur J Polit Econ 20:495-508
20. Garfinkel MR, Skaperdas S (2006) Economics of conflict: an overview. In: Hartley K, Sandler T (eds) Handbook of defense economics, vol 2. North Holland, Amsterdam (forthcoming)
21. Gellner E (1983) Nations and nationalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
22. Gershenson D, Grossman HI (2000) Civil conflict: Ended or never ending? J Conflict Resolut 44(6):807-821
23. Goyal S, Staal K (2004) The political economy of regionalism. Eur Econ Rev 48:563-593
24. Grossman HI (1991) A general equilibrium model of insurrections. Am Econ Rev 81:912-921
25. Grossman HI (1994) Production, appropriation, and land reform. Am Econ Rev 84:705-712
26. Grossman HI, Iyigun MF (1997) Population increase and the end of colonialism. Economica 64:483-93
27. Grossman HI, Kim M (1995) Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property. J Polit Econ 103:1275-1288
28. Gurr TR (2000) Peoples versus states: minorities at risk in the new century. US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC
29. Haavelmo T (1954) A study in the theory of economic evolution. North Holland, Amsterdam
30. Hiscox M (2003) Political integration and disintegration in the global economy. In: Kahler M, Lake D (eds) Globalizing authority. Princeton University Press, Princeton
31. Hirshleifer J (1989) Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: ratio versus difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63:101-112
32. Hirshleifer J (1991) The technology of conflict as an economic activity. Am Econ Rev 81(2):130-134
33. Hirshleifer J (1995) Anarchy and its breakdown. J Polit Econ 103(1):26-52
34. Horowitz DL (1985) Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press, Berkeley
35. Lake D, O'Mahony A (2004) The incredible shrinking state: explaining the territorial size of countries. J Conflict Resolut 48(5):699-722
36. LeBreton M, Weber S (2003) The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession. IMF Staff Pap 50(3):403-435
37. Lester A (2005) Trade and the end of trust: endogenous group formation and inter-group hostility. Brown University
38. Münster J, Staal K (2005) War with outsiders make peace inside. Discussion paper no. 75, University of Mannheim
39. Powell R (1999) In the shadow of power: states and strategies in international politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
40. Skaperdas S (1992) Cooperation, conflict and power in the absence of property rights. Am Econ Rev 82(4):720-39
41. Skaperdas S, Vaidya S (2005) Persuasion as a contest. University of California, Irvine
42. Spolaore E (2004) Economic integration, international conflict and political unions. Rivista di Politica Economica 94:3-50
43. Spolaore (2006) National borders and the size of nations. In: Weingast BR, Wittman DA (eds) The Oxford handbook of political economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
44. Tilly C (1990) Coercion, capital and European states, AD 990-1990. Blackwell, Cambridge
45. Tullock G (1980) Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan JM, Tollison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station
46. Wittman DA (2000) The wealth and size of nations. J Conflict Resolut 6:885-895