Agent-based analysis of capacity withholding and tacit collusion in electricity markets

IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 1735-1742

  Tellidou, Athina C ^a   Bakirtzis, Anastasios G ^a  

^a ARISTOTLE UNIVERSITY OF THESSALONIKI   (Greece)

Author keywords

Agent based simulation; Capacity withholding; Collusion; Energy management; Game theory; Learning; Pricing; Reinforcement learning; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; MARKETING; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING;

AGENT-BASED SIMULATION; ENERGY MARKET; LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING;

ELECTRIC UTILITIES;

EID: 36348967842     PISSN: 08858950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2007.907533     Document Type: Article

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